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This link opens in a new windowInitially introduced by James MacGregor Burns in 1978 and Bernard Bass in1985, these transformational and transactional leadership styles have sustained nearly four decades. Through idealized transformational leader behaviors, one may raise the levels of their ethical and moral values while committing to "doing the right thing" for themselves and their followers: (1) by using inspirational motivation, leaders learn to articulate a vision to energize followers to accomplish more than they ever thought possible; (2) by intellectually stimulating followers, leaders will challenge followers to create and innovate as they reframe problems with renewed visions; and (3) by providing individualized consideration, leaders may learn to incorporate each member's distinct gifts and talents as individual contributors to the organizational team. These transformational behaviors can offer connections to reaching authentic transformational leadership by incorporating not only ethics and values but also, according to John Sosik, virtues and character strengths to refine one's leadership acumen, ameliorating leader-follower dynamics.--Provided by publisher.
Deterrence in the cyber domain is drastically different and far more complicated than in the other military domains of air, land, sea, and space. cyber weapons and offensive cyber techniques are relatively inexpensive and easily obtained or developed. the number of adversary groups capable of attacking US networks is large, and our ability to deter each group will vary based on their motives and levels of risk tolerance. an effective cyber deterrence strategy must be multilayered and use all instruments of US national power. this paper explores the difficulties of deterring unwanted cyber activities, sets some realistic expectations for a deterrence strategy, and offers proposals to help mitigate the problems.--Provided by publisher.
"A series of high-profile ethical lapses by senior military professionals has generated calls from levels as high as the commander in chief for a renewed emphasis on military ethics. Leaders engaged in professional military education (PME) across the joint force have worked to ensure their programs support this call. This paper explores and assesses the ethics education programs at the service senior leader colleges (war colleges). There are three fundamental questions facing those charged with teaching ethics to senior military officers. What are the desired outcomes of ethics education? How should the curriculum be structured to achieve those outcomes? And, finally, what is the correct faculty composition to develop and employ that curriculum? Using the answers to those questions to produce a rough framework for a model war college ethics education program, this paper then compares the current war college programs to this model form in order to determine areas of strength and weakness. This analysis reveals that the existing ethics education programs at the war colleges compare favorably to the model program structure. However, leaders at these institutions could further strengthen their programs by creating and empowering an "ethics team" that includes trained ethicists and military practitioners and by conducting more robust faculty development programs for nonethicists."--Provided by publisher.
In 2012, former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta warned the United States of a potential "cyber Pearl Harbor" attack on our nation's infrastructure, and the reality of the threat has already been demonstrated. In December 2014, Germany's Federal Office for Information Security acknowledged that hackers breached an unnamed German industrial plant's control systems, preventing the shutdown of a furnace and thereby causing "widespread" damage.--Provided by publisher.
This study comprises an analysis of Australia's involvement in the 1975-99 East Timor crisis. Using a realist lens to analyze international decision making, this study examines how global and regional power dynamics have influenced Australia's pursuit of the national interest. Specifically, the study addresses why Australian support for military intervention in East Timor took 25 years to develop--Provided by publisher.
"The central goal of this thesis is to determine whether or not something inherent in US military culture makes members of the Department of Defense (DOD) more prone to sexual assault than their civilian counterparts."--Provided by publisher.
Abstract: "The United States has used primacy as its grand strategy for some time now. While this strategy has ensured US hegemony, it has also fiscally drained American power and left the United States with a poor global standing. As such, the United States should rethink its grand strategy in order to maintain its relative position in the twenty-first century. The United States is poised to pivot eastward to meet the demands of China as a rising challenger. The question I raise here is, how viable would an alternative grand strategy in Asia be? There is considerable enthusiasm in some corners of the policy-making world for the United States to return to a balancing strategy in Asia. Formerly known as offshore balancing, the strategy aims to conserve American power as it deals with the challenges of a rising China. One important, albeit overlooked, element of offshore balancing is, who plays the role of the balancer? This thesis seeks to answer that question."
Biography of Andrew Marshall.
"This study evaluates Jimmy Doolittle’s performance as an operational air
commander."
Abstract: "This study examines the role of moral hazard in airlift operations. The author turns to the world of economics and insurance to define moral hazard and then examines two historical case studies through this lens. By conducting a comparative case study of the airlift-dependent operations at Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh and examining these in terms of moral hazard, the author establishes that moral hazard plays a role in airlift operations, that this role is not predictive in nature, that this role illuminates risks that may otherwise go unnoticed, and that there is a positive relationship between airlift capacity and moral hazard. The author then examines US airlift operations in Iraq and Afghanistan from 2001 to 2011 in light of the conclusions drawn from Dien Bien Phu and Khe Sanh. This comparison provides additional evidence for the case at hand and demonstrates the relevance to present-day events and concerns. The author postulates that a doctrinal solution best addresses moral hazard in airlift operations by informing the application of airlift in military operations while not arbitrarily curtailing or limiting those operations. The author concludes that such a doctrinal solution helps to inform military judgment and ensures risks associated with airlift-dependent operations are more fully accounted for than they would be otherwise."
This study addresses the challenge of basing air refueling forces in regions marked by scarcities of appropriate airfields and powerful antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) threats from regional enemies. In such conflicts, the scale of required tanker deployments likely will overwhelm the number of first-class airfields available to accommodate the airliner-based air refueling aircraft in the United States Air Force fleet. Moreover, tankers based in forward areas will be subject to a wide range of enemy attacks on the ground and in the air. Consequently, this study begins by discussing the nature of the threats posed to forward-based air refueling units by modern A2/AD systems and then examines various basing concepts to mitigate those threats. The basing concepts explored are hardening of aircraft shelters and support facilities, disaggregation of refueling units among prepared bases, and agile disaggregation among more austere base infrastructures. The study also includes discussion of the potential value of introducing a midsized “tactical” tanker to the fleet able to operate from airfields substantially shorter and more weakly surfaced than these required by the current fleet of modified airliners. The study concludes by recommending greater focus on agile disaggregation, acquisition of a fleet segment of tactical tankers, and directions for further analysis.
History reveals a Janus-faced, nearly schizophrenic military attitude towards technological innovation. Some technologies are stymied by bureaucratic skepticism; others are exuberantly embraced by the organization. The opposing perceptions of technological skepticism and technological exuberance that characterize military history mirror the different interpretations of technology's role in society. Thomas Hughes' theory of technological momentum attempted to reconcile two of the disparate ideologies, that of social constructivism and technological determinism. The theory of technological dislocations advanced by this thesis is a refinement of Hughes' theory and is more reflective of the complex, interdependent relationship that exists between technology and society.Drawing on a single, detailed historical case study examining the development of air-to-air armament within the US Air Force, post-World War II through Operation Rolling Thunder, this thesis illustrates how an unwavering commitment to existing technologies and a fascination with the promise of new technologies often obfuscate an institution's ability to recognize and adapt to an evolving strategic environment. The importance of a keen marketing strategy in outmaneuvering bureaucratic skepticism, the benefits of adopting a strategy of innovative systems integration vice outright systems acquisition, and the need for credible, innovative individuals and courageous commanders willing to act on their subordinates' recommendations are all revealed as being critical to successful technological innovation.
"This study suggests a path for Afghanistan's post-2014 future based on the post-Civil War experience of the US South. A comparative history of both societies reveals the common presence of three foundational traits: highly differentiated class structures, ethnically and economically diverse societal mosaics, and a belief in peripheral and societal autonomy. I assess the prospects for either renewed civil war or stable peace in Afghanistan after US and coalition military forces complete their withdrawal"--Provided by publisher.
This paper explores the roots of the Air Force's identity problems to explain why many previous leadership-driven identity initiatives—bits of sizzle in the form of a shiny logo, fresh motto, or revamped uniform—have been so startlingly unsuccessful. It concludes that senior Air Force leaders have failed, in part, because of their disregard for the powerful roles that organizational cultures play in the day-to-day lives of the average Airman. In the end, a leader will be truly successful only by discovering and communicating an emergent sense of Airman culture that resonates throughout the rank and file and inspires Airmen with a clear and compelling “why.”
Tyler analyzes the Malayan Emergency of 1948–1960 focusing on the intelligence needs and methods of the British high commissioner, Sir Gerald Templer. He demonstrates the importance of information gathering and analysis in bringing about the ultimate British victory. Operational design is “a highly complex mental process that imagines the future, reflects on the past, and produces an understanding of both the problem and the optimal solution.” Templer and his intelligence professionals did not—indeed could not—consciously use design as a methodology, they intuitively grasped and applied its essence.
Executive Summary: "In this paper, I draw upon the US experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan to highlight key lessons for integrating intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations into military campaigns and major operations. I point out how the US military’s adherence to a Cold War–era collection management doctrine creates obstacles for ISR integration. This system of managing competing requirements as a basis for ISR operations has proven ineffective repeatedly in military operations due to the emphasis on collection statistics that do not account for operational realities.
I argue that a strategy-oriented approach that balances ISR ends, ways, and means will more effectively meet commanders’ needs and expectations. Using this approach, I suggest means by which commanders can steer the vast, organizationally complex ISR enterprise toward problem solving over production. A vital part of that process is articulating the commander’s intent for ISR that links campaign goals to intelligence problem sets, ISR roles and missions, and ISR objectives.
By comparing ISR in Iraq and Afghanistan, I identify the advancements in resourcing, organization, and procedures that made considerable impacts on the battlefield. Using these lessons, I make practical recommendations on how commanders and staffs should organize and operate to effectively execute an ISR strategy."
Abstract: "Force-structure analysis—the mathematical and scientific discipline of assessing the utility of various material force structures—is critical to the process of planning, programming, and acquiring the military means to provide for national security and to shape the strategic environment. For this analysis to provide appropriate recommendations regarding force structure, however, it is vital that the prevailing analytic paradigm be consistent with the true nature of force structure, the environment, and their relationship to one another. This analysis presents a theory of complex adaptive systems and demonstrates that force structures are examples of such systems. The argument is then made that the prevailing paradigm of the force-structure-analysis community in the United States Air Force is inconsistent with this reality. A collection of recommendations identifies low-cost opportunities with the potential for significant long-term effects in aligning the force-structure-analysis paradigm with the fact that force structures are complex adaptive systems."
