Lutz, M. J. (1997). Civic virtue and Socratic virtue. Polity, 29(4), 565-592.
Many contemporary observers believe that liberal states need to encourage the virtues of citizenship as a corrective to calculative individualism. Yet others fear that any such effort will jeopardize autonomy and diversity. A fuller understanding of Plato's account of the character, importance, and deficiencies of civic virtue provides the best starting point for our own reflections on civic virtue. A dramatic reading of The Republic elucidates Plato's account of the differences between civic and philosophic virtue by focusing on what prevents Glaucon from understanding and accepting Socrates' teaching about justice. Because Glaucon regards justice as altogether selfless while also insisting that it is the means to his own complete happiness, his virtue is sub-philosophic. Not only are his opinions shaped by the standards of his political community but he also lacks the steadfastness of soul needed to understand how justice can lead to his own happiness or recognize how it does so in Socrates. At the same time, this dramatic reading reveals that Socrates does not simply dismiss civic accounts of virtue since it is only by recognizing their power that he can affirm the nobility, justness, and goodness of the philosophic life.